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bargai[s85,jmc]		The bases for a bargain with the Soviet Union

	There might be a basis for bargains with the Soviet Union
involving matters not previously negotiated.

	There are many things we want from the Soviet Union and
many things they want from us.  Some of the things they want from
us and some of the things we want from them are non-negotiable;
neither country could give them up without fundamentally changing
its character.  Others can be given provided the price is right.
We will concentrate on the negotiable items, but the items that
are probably non-negotiable will be mentioned, because either side
may indulge in either wishful thinking or propaganda leading it
to ask for what the other side cannot give.

	While the previous paragraph is written symmetrically between
the U.S. and the Soviet Union, I don't want to imply that the the
two countries are similar, especially morally.  I regard the Soviet
Union as an ``evil empire'' to use President Reagan's phrase.
Since there doesn't seem to be any feasible way of getting rid of it,
we have to explore what advantages there might be in negotiating
with it.  Also while it would be nice to get the better of it in
negotiations, I believe that what can be obtained by cleverness
is marginal.  The bargains I suggest are genuinely of advantage
to both the U.S. and to the Party bosses of the Soviet Union.

	The largest area of trade I have to suggest is some of our
technology for some of their secrecy.  Here ``our'' refers to the
West in general and not just to the U.S.  Most likely the
intergovernmental agreements would only involve export licenses.
They would still have to pay the owners of specific technologies.

	First consider why they might want our agreement on
technology badly enough to pay something.  Their technology
is inferior and they show no signs of catching up in the
forseeable future.  In the important area of computer technology,
which I have followed, it seems to me that they are further
behind than they were in 1965 when I made my first visit to
the Soviet Union.

	They make extensive efforts to steal technology, and
these efforts are often successful, but stealing is no substitute
for buying.  This is because fully successful use of technology
developed elsewhere require continued interaction with the
developers.  It requires the ability to ask questions when
difficulties arise.  It requires continued access to improved versions
of the technology; otherwise one gets into blind alleys.

	I remember visiting a Chinese computer that I suspect was built
with smuggled integrated circuits.  While it was a good computer,
it wasn't going into mass production, and I suspect that was because
there was no guarantee of a continued supply of the circuits.
Even if improved relations might permit a continued supply, it
might be that what they succeeded in smuggling represented a line
of development that was later discontinued.  When such items are
bought legitimately for production prototypes, the contracts
contain agreements about continued supply and often provide for
the licensing of a second source to protect the buyer even if
the supplier goes broke.

	Of course, when the Soviets are permitted to buy Western
technology, their own command economy and penchant for secrecy
often leads them to lose the benefits.  Part of the problem is
that permission to buy the technology and the negotiation of
the terms involves at least the Soviet organization that wants
it and the Ministry of Foreign trade that jealously guards its
monopoly on foreign trade (a measure instituted by Lenin himself
and currently regarded as sacred).  One can imagine that the
situation is actually worse than that.  The permission probably
goes through the ministerial hierarchy above the user of the
technology and the relevant supervisory parts of the Party
bureaucracy.  Any of these organizations can inject delays into
the original deal or into resupply arrangements.  If getting
continued foreign assistance might involve foreigners
finding out about Soviet deficiencies, the Party, the KGB and
the military may all have veto power.

	We can laugh at their falling over their own feet, but
if we want something in return for the technology, it has to be
a good buy for them.  In so far as what we trade for access to
the technology is their secrecy, this obviates one of their
difficulties in maintaining the buyer-seller arrangements.

	Now let's consider our desire to reduce their secrecy.
They are quite good at keeping secrets, both from foreigners
and from their own people.  Foreigners are forbidden to visit
most of the Soviet Union including the whole Ural industrial
area including some cities of over a million population.
These prohibitions include their satellites.

	Of course, we have our satellite observations.  I don't
know what their capabilities are, but it worries me that we
have depended on them for twenty years without ``ground truth''
to verify our interpretations.  Worse, we have negotiated with
them about disarmament on the basis of our own observations of
what they have.  This means that they can test their ability
to conceal a particular military-industrial activity by
seeing if we mention it.  The uncertainty probably has the
effect that the military assume the worst and demand a margin
of safety from the negotiators of arms reduction, and this
margin may reduce the possibility of agreement.

	There is no doubt that the secrecy is a real advantage to
them.  Reading Khrushchev's memoirs suggests that a major advantage
to them is that it conceals weaknesses.  However, if we knew about
these weaknesses we might be able to reduce our military expenditures.
However, it also conceals their operational plans.  We apparently
were caught by surprise in 1968 by the invasion of Czechoslovakia
and in 1979 by the invasion of Afghanistan.  It will take quite
a swap of technology to get them to open their country.
On the other hand full access to Western technology would be very
valuable to them.

	As far as technology goes, partial access is entirely
feasible if we only can only get a partial lifting of the
Iron Curtain.

Remarks:

	1. What do we want beyond the right for foreigners to
travel throughout the Soviet Union.  Surely, this must involve
a relaxation of the laws punishing talking to foreigners.
Presumably, we also want the right to install equipment to
monitor nuclear tests.

	2. In my opinion the abolition of nuclear weapons is not
a desirable goal.  It makes the world too unstable with regard
to a race for their re-introduction.  Facilities with other uses
that are easily converted to produce components for nuclear
weapons are too difficult to define.  Restrictions on what
scientists are allowed to know that is convertible into the
ability to make nuclear weapons.
There is also the problem of third parties.